The Betrayal of East Pakistan : -Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi
General Tikka Khan was sent as Yaqub's replacement on 7 March 1971. Tikka arrived in Dhaka by air and took over the duties of Commander, Eastern Command, MLA, and Governor of East Pakistan. He was not welcomed; in fact he was presented with a garland of shoes at the airport. To top it all, the Chief Justice refused to swear him in as Governor. Tikka was a straightforward, hard?working, and unassuming person. He lacked Yaqub's slick and suave manner; in fact he was not the sort of person to inspire confidence in others. He lacked strategic insight and tactical flair, yet a halo of grandeur and vicarious heroism had been woven around him.
On taking over the command of Eastern Garrison, Gen. Tikka tried to meet Sheikh Mujib. Although Mujib had met Yaqub, he refused to meet Tikka. Gen. Tikka issued a directive to the troops, based on the mission spelled out to him; this included: disarming of the East Bengal Regiment, battalions of the East Pakistan Rifles, and the police; security of Chittagong naval base; control of airfields including Lal Munir Hut and Ishurdi; security of towns.
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On 25 March General Tikka Khan had available to him for military action only 14 Infantry Division, under the command of Major?General Khadim Hussain Raja. It consisted of four brigades, located in different cantonments and camps all over East Pakistan. In the division there were twelve infantry battalions (all West Pakistan), seven infantry battalions (all East Pakistan) and one commando battalion (mixed). These battalions had officers from both West and East Pakistan. In supporting arms he had one light tank regiment, five regiments of field artillery, one regiment of light anti?aircraft artillery, and two mortar batteries. Troops in these units were mixed West and East Pakistanis. There were sixteen wings of the East Pakistan Rifles, about sixteen thousand strong these were all East Pakistanis except a few officers and junior commissioned officers from West Pakistan. There were also naval and air force troops, some of which could be used in a ground role in Chittagong and Dhaka.
It should be borne in mind that the Bengali troops had not yet mutinied. General Tikka had enough strength available to complete his task. The requirements were proper planning, intelligent conduct of operations, and patience, because facing him was not a regular army but dissident armed civilians. More tact than tactics was the order of the day
On the night between 25/26 March 1971, General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying, and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty, more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Changez Khan and Halaku Khan, or at Jallianwala Bagh by the British General Dyer.
General Tikka, instead of carrying out the tasks given to him, i.e., to disarm armed Bengali units and persons and to take into custody the Bengali leaders, resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched?earth policy. His orders to his troops were: `I want the land and not the people.' These orders were carried out in letter and spirit by Major?General Farman and Brigadier (later Lt. Gen.) Jahanzeb Arbab in Dhaka. Major?General Rao Farman had written in his table diary, `Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red.' It was painted red by Bengali blood. This diary was found by the Bengalis when they occupied Government House on 14 December 1971. Mujib showed the diary to Bhutto during his visit to Bangladesh. Bhutto inquired from me about this diary during my meeting with him.
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On the night between 25/26 March 1971 Yahya sneaked out of Dhaka before the start of military action. He told Tikka before leaving Dhaka, `Sort them out.' Bhutto had remained behind to see what Tikka did. Bhutto saw Dhaka burning and heard the cries of the people, the crackle of burning material, the roar of tanks, the boom of guns and rockets, and the rattle of machine guns. In the morning, it is alleged, Bhutto patted Tikka, Farman, and Arbab on the back, congratulated them for doing exactly what was needed, and assured them that their future was secured. Bhutto kept his promise. Tikka secured the coveted post of COAS. Farman was made Chairman, Fauji Foundation, and Brigadier Arbab, despite the corruption charge proved against him, was promoted as Major General and later Lieutenant General. On reaching Karachi on 26 March, he told the people, `Thank God Pakistan has been saved.'
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Major?General Rao Farman Ali was Military Adviser to the Governor, and Brigadier Faqir Muhammad was Brigadier Martial Law. Brigadier Jilani (Later Lt. Gen. and Governor) was my COS (Chief of Staff), replacing Brigadier E1?Edroos. Major?General Shaukat Riza was Commanding 9 Division. Major?General Rahim had replaced Major?General Khadim Raja as GOC 14 Division. Major?General Nazar Hussain Shah was GOC 16 Division, and Major?General Jamshad was head of CAF (Civil Armed Forces), replacing Brigadier Nisar. Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore Inam were commanding the navel and air force contigents.
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The tasks were to be completed by 15 May 1971 at the latest. It was emphasized that speed and multiple thrusts would pay dividends.
16 Division under Major?General Nazar Hussain Shah was responsible for Rajshahi Civil Division. Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogra, and Rajshahi were to be held. Due to the closeness of Indian cantonments, and the area being flat and suitable for tanks in dry weather, the only tank regiment in East Pakistan was given to this Division.
9 Division under Major?General Shaukat Riza was responsible for Dhaka and Khulna Divisions. Dhaka, being the provincial capital and an international airport, was vital.
There were no obstacles on the northern side of Dhaka, but there were good covering positions in area Madhupur Forest and around Tangil City. Mymensingh was to be held in strength. Khulna Division was the next priority after Rajshahi Division, again due to the proximity of Indian cantonments?it was comparatively easy for the Indian Army to concentrate troops in front of this position. Jessore was to be held in strength; Faridpur was also to be held as it gave depth to Jessore and assured protection to Dhaka as well.
The waterlogged areas of Chalna, Barisal, and the Sunderbans were given to CAF.
14 Division under Major?General Rahim Khan was responsible for Chittagong Division. Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla, and Chittagong were to be held. Chittagong was vital. Commandos were deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
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The new deployment was as under:
16 Division of three Brigades and an armoured regiment under Major?General Nazar Hussain Shah in area Dinajpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi, Palma, and Bogra.
9 Division of two Brigades under Major?General M. H. Ansari to be responsible for area Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal, Bhola Island, Patuakhali, Khulna, Jessore, Chauhadanga, and Mehrabpur. Paksey Bridge was included in the area of 9 Division.
The waterlogged areas of Chalna, Barisal, and Sunderbans remained with the CAF.